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Proposals for a European Corporate Taxation  




The European Commission is currently discussing a reform of profit taxation for multina-
tional corporations operating in the European Union (EU). The intention is to come closer to a 
harmonized European domestic market. The academic and political discourse mainly focuses 
on the concept of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). On the political 
level a team of experts chosen by the EU Commission is investigating special issues of 
CCCTB. CCCTB is considered the long-term comprehensive solution for eliminating the ob-
stacles faced by multinational corporations operating in the European single market.
1 Since 
full details of the proposed CCCTB are not available at present, only the fundamental outline 
of the concept is known, whereas major aspects (e.g., determination of the tax base, classifica-
tion of the companies to be consolidated, allocation factor) remain unspecified.  
There is a vast body of literature on CCCTB. Numerous descriptive and comparative analyses 
illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of CCCTB (e.g., Cerioni, 2006; Plaesschaert, 
2005; Mintz and Weiner, 2003; Sørensen, 2004; Weiner, 2002; Giannini, 2002). Further con-
tributions concentrate on a significant component of CCCTB that has not yet been detailed: 
the allocation factor of the consolidated profit of the respective Member States (“formula ap-
portionment”). 
Formula apportionment (FA) became a part of US tax law in the early 20th century (Ford, 
1930; Hellerstein, 1968; Hellerstein and McLure, 2004), so several academically and practi-
cally orientated papers particularly in US literature have been written and contributed to the 
general debate since the 1960s (e.g. Gordon and Wilson, 1986; Musgrave, 1984; Hellerstein, 
1968). Based on these experiences many recommendations for the allocation factor have been 
                                                 
1 Cf. European Commission, 2006a.   - 3 - 
made, for example by Hellerstein/McLure (2004) for implementing a US-style enterprise tax 
law system in the EU. US tax law includes the factors payroll, property and sales, whereas 
Canadian tax law comprises the factors payroll and sales. Several studies deal with distortions 
caused by a different weighting of these factors (e.g. McLure, 1980; Goolsbee and Maydew, 
2000; Gordon and Wilson, 1986; Anand and Sansing, 2000; Nielsen et al., 2001). In consid-
eration of company taxation developments in the EU, research focuses on the activities of the 
European Commission and their possible implications. In this context a number of authors 
focus on the definition of FA (e.g. Mintz, 2008, Schreiber 2008, Spengel 2008, Wellisch, 
2004; Eggert and Schjelderup, 2003). Other analyses focus on loss offset under CCCTB (e.g. 
Weiner and Gérard, 2003) and the effects of implementing CCCTB in the EU (e.g. Raventós-
Calvo and de Juan y Penalosa, 2002).   
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are likely to be used as starting point for 
CCCTB. Against this background Oestreicher and Spengel (2007) investigate which elements 
of IFRS can be integrated to meet the requirements of CCCTB and how the application of 
IFRS can influence the effective tax burden of companies in selected EU Member States. Us-
ing the European tax analyzer Jacobs et al. (2005) evaluate and compare the effects of 
CCCTB under IFRS on the effective tax burden of 13 Member States. They find the introduc-
tion of IFRS to have a significant impact on the effective tax burden in the participating coun-
tries compared to the current differences that exist throughout the EU. Further, IFRS only lead 
to a marginal increase in the effective tax burden. Thus, an economic analysis identifying pos-
sible tax incentives and in turn, possible distortions of CCCTB based on effective average tax 
rates has already been performed. Similar effects were obtained by Eberhartinger and Klos-
termann (2007) who study empirically the potential tax effects of using IFRS as the basis for 
national corporate taxation. Their evidence suggests that no dramatic change in the tax base is 
to be expected. Furthermore, Fuest et al. (2006) analyze the budgetary consequences of an 
EU-wide common tax base and investigate the effects of allocation to the EU Member States   - 4 - 
using data provided by the German Central Bank. Kiesewetter (2005) or Kiesewetter and 
Mugler (2007) refer to the possibility of influencing the tax burden from CCTB. Whereas 
CCCTB sacrifices part of the Member States’ autonomy an EU-wide tax system that main-
tains both financial and tax autonomy can be an attractive alternative for the transnational 
taxation of multinational corporations. The European Tax Allocation System (ETAS) is such 
a tax system (European Commission (2003), p. 10; Hernler (2003, 2004a, 2004b)). Despite 
being a relatively unknown concept, the European Commission is considering the continued 
development of ETAS at EU level. One recommendation, similar to the ETAS approach that 
is currently being discussed by the Academic Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance is the “principle of domicile with separate entity accounting” (Wissenschaftlicher 
Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007)).
2 In this context, advantages and disad-
vantages of an EU-wide minimum tax rate are analyzed. 
Hernler (2003, 2004a, 2004b) focuses the investigation of ETAS on a comparative description 
with respect to different incomes. A comprehensive economic and quantitative analysis and 
comparison with CCCTB has not been completed to date.  
In this paper we develop decision rules for investors and draw general conclusions about the 
influence on corporate decisions of taxing multinationals under ETAS or CCCTB. The inves-
tigation is based on a dynamic model of capital budgeting. Referring to real corporation data 
and modelling a representative multinational group, the effects of ETAS and CCCTB on the 
corporations' choice of international location are analyzed.  
Section 2 illustrates the systems in a descriptive way. In section 3 we provide a multi-period 
analysis of marginal investment decisions of a multinational group. Our investigation aims to 
identify settings under ETAS and CCCTB for which tax planning remains possible, and to 
show when a real investment is tax favoured or tax discriminated. In this context, we deter-
mine the required minimum pre-tax rate of return on investment of a real investment in com-
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parison to a financial investment in a multinational corporation. Thus, we can identify when a 
real investment is tax favoured or tax discriminated by the underlying tax system. In the fol-
lowing analysis we model the effects of retention policy, different determination of taxable 
income and the relocation of a business entity’s domicile under ETAS and CCCTB. In addi-
tion, the concept of CCCTB is analyzed with respect to the differentiation between business 
income and non-business income. Finally, we demonstrate to what extent the tax burden of 
corporations can be influenced by ETAS and CCCTB. 
 
2 European Corporate Tax Concepts  
2.1 European Tax Allocation System (ETAS) 
The European Tax Allocation System is a proposal for the harmonization of international 
company taxation in the European Union. The system is based on current tax systems across 
the EU. If a group of affiliated companies is characterized by certain conditions, the ETAS 
holding can opt to include its subsidiary or subsidiaries into the ETAS group. 
If it does so, the group is taxed according to particular taxation rules. As fundamental prereq-
uisites, the parent company and its subsidiaries have to be domiciled in and managed from an 
EU Member State. In addition, the companies must prepare their financial statements by the 
same closing date. Also, the parent company must hold, indirectly or directly, at least 50% of 
equity or voting rights of the subsidiary.   
Taxable income and corporate tax are determined by the tax laws of the Member State of 
domicile. In a second step the tax bases before national loss-offset, which are separately de-
termined in each country in accordance with national tax laws, are summed up.
3 After the 
group loss offset is performed, this so-called “EU tax base” represents the total tax base of the 
group for the tax assessment period under review. Multiplying this EU tax base with the tax 
rate in the parent company’s state of domicile produces the multinational corporation's EU 
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base tax. The EU base tax is set off against the corporate tax the subsidiaries have to pay to 
the respective Member State. Any shortfall in taxes has to be paid to the parent company's 
country of domicile; any excess tax paid forms what is known as an EU tax credit carry for-
ward, which is credited towards the corporation's tax burden in subsequent years. This EU tax 
credit carry forward can be continued as account carried forward within the affiliated group 
and can thus be entirely set off against the corporate tax of the following years.
4 In ETAS the 
tax burden of real investments for multinational corporations significantly depends on the EU 
tax credit mechanism and the EU tax credit carry forward. Furthermore, the perpetuation of 
national tax laws and the resulting added tax base (EU tax base), multiplied with the tax rate 
of the respective Member State, are major factors.  
Consequently, ETAS has been included in the Commission's work programme.
5  
 
2.2. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)  
CCCTB is a system based on one common consolidated tax base for multinational corpora-
tions operating transnationally in the European Union. Existing EU tax legislation is extended 
to include a new tax base that is not founded on national tax law. All Member States have to 
cooperate on determining this common tax base. The intention is to apply CCCTB uniformly 
in all Member States and to eliminate country-specific differences.
6  
Various working parties of the Commission are currently examining what conditions have to 
be met in order to qualify for CCCTB. However, it has already been agreed that it shall apply 
to the regulations for a group of eligible companies that are domiciled in the participating 
Member States. A working group is currently discussing the requirements that have to be met 
by participating corporations and which subsidiaries will be apportioned to the consolidated 
                                                 
4 Cf. Hernler, 2004b, p. 248, Hernler, 2004a, p. 394. 
5 Cf. European Commission, 2003, p. 10. 
6 Cf. Cnossen, 2001, pp. 532-535; Mintz and Weiner, 2003, 695-697; Plasschaert, 2005, 64-67.   - 7 - 
companies.
7 The Commission favours the introduction of an option for taxation under 
CCCTB. In any case, however, it must be defined which corporations are eligible.
8  
To determine the tax base, the profits are calculated according to uniform European regula-
tions for each affiliate. Subsequently, the affiliates' profits are consolidated to yield a consoli-
dated figure. This consolidated tax base is then apportioned to the Member States using a yet 
to be defined key.
9   
While this procedure restricts the Member States' tax autonomy, they still determine their own 
tax rates. The tax burden is calculated by multiplying the tax rate with the proportionately 
apportioned CCCTB. The majority of issues specific to CCCTB, notably consolidation and 
apportionment, have not been resolved so far. If US-style formal apportionment will be im-
plemented, the factors payroll, property and sales would become very significant.
10 Consoli-
dation is expected to be based on IFRS, modified by tax aspects. The rules for loss-offset are 
still under discussion. Currently it is unclear whether non-business income will be included in 
the loss compensation. If so, a huge potential for loss-offset will be available.     
A significant impact on the tax burden under CCCTB arises from the consolidated tax base, 
the transnational loss-offset, the apportionment formula and the type and weighting of the 
apportionment factors. In turn, the distinction between business income and non-business in-
come is important. Particularly relevant aspects of these items are discussed in the following 
analysis.  
Both the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee are in fa-
vour of implementing CCCTB.
11 Working groups have been established at EU level that fo-
cus exclusively on drafting components of CCCTB.
12       
 
                                                 
7 Cf. European Commission, 2006b, pp. 4-6. 
8 Cf. European Commission, 2007, p. 2. 
9 Cf. European Commission, 2006a, pp. 6-8. 
10 Cf., e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000, p 125; European Commission, 2001, p. 45, Eggert and Schjelderup, 2003, pp. 439-
446; Wellisch, 2004, p. 24-41. 
11 Cf., e.g., European Parliament, 2006, p. 6; European Economic and Social Committee, 2006, C88/48. 
12 Cf. European Commission, 2006b, pp. 3-4.   - 8 - 
2.3 ETAS vs. CCCTB 
The previous explanations point out that CCCTB and ETAS differ significantly. However, the 
systems also show several similarities. The following table provides an overview of the simi-
larities and differences:  
Table 1: Comparison of ETAS and CCCTB 
 ETAS  CCCTB 
basis of the system   maintaining current tax systems to foster 
tax rate competition and convergence of 
tax rates  
harmonization of tax bases 
basis for consolidation   actual tax law of the EU Member State   implementation of uniform European 
regulations (IFRS as starting point)  
participating companies  holdings and subsidiaries domiciled in 
EU Member States  
holdings and subsidiaries domiciled in EU 
Member States  
involved tax types  corporate income tax   corporate income tax  
tax rates  maintaining tax rates  
(with the objective of harmonization)  
 
maintaining tax rates 
(discussion about a harmonization of tax 
rates or a minimum tax rate)  
option to perpetuate the current tax 
system  
yes yes 
subject to changes of the current tax 
system 
maintaining of the current accounting 
rules, modifications are obtainable in the 
short- to medium-term  
implementation of new accounting rules, 
extension of the current tax system, basic 
modifications are obtainable in the long-
term  
effort and cost involved in imple-
menting the system  
for corporations and tax authorities, 
relatively simple and low-cost 
considerable complexity for corporations 
and tax authorities  
tax autonomy of the Member States   tax autonomy maintained  tax autonomy restricted 
legal form of consolidated entities   according to tax legislation in the Mem-
ber State of domicile  
corporation   
credit mechanism   corporate tax paid by the subsidiaries 
decreases the group’s tax burden  
no credit mechanism 
allocation of income  no allocation   allocation factors: formula apportionment 
problem of transfer pricing  minimized using credit mechanism  minimized by using common consolidated 
tax base  
loss-offset  group-wide loss-offset   group-wide loss-offset  
compliance costs  lower   lower 
Transparency of determining tax-
able income 
no EU-wide transparency  strong EU-wide transparency 
 
 
3 Quantitative Analysis of Tax implications for European Corporate Investment 
3.1 The Model 
3.1.1 General Assumptions 
As there are significant differences in tax rates and tax bases across the EU Member States, it 
cannot be claimed that taxation is neutral with respect to company location. Against this 
background, we will investigate the degree of tax distortion of transnational investments un-
der ETAS and CCCTB. We will examine whether ETAS or CCCTB can reduce the distor-  - 9 - 
tions that exist under the current national tax laws across the EU. Our reference tax system is 
the EU’s current system of taxation. In the following we take the German tax system as a 
proxy for corporate tax law. We will determine the required minimum rate of return (before 
tax) and in turn, the pre-tax cost of capital of a transnational investment based on the different 
concepts of taxation. The pre-tax cost of capital represents the required minimum rate of re-
turn before taxes that a real investment has to achieve to provide the investor with the same 
after-tax rate of return as an alternative financial investment. To identify the different tax bur-
dens we determine and compare the pre-tax cost of capital of an investment that is otherwise 
identical, especially with respect to the post-tax return. The pre-tax cost of capital is deter-
mined recursively by the Baldwin yield
13 of the investment.  
We perform an international comparison of tax burdens applying a dynamic capital budgeting 
model and running a numerical simulation of tax assessment. We model a parent company, 
domiciled in country A, and its wholly-owned subsidiary, located in country B. Countries A 
and B are both assumed to be EU Member States. The multinational corporation is planning 
an investment (e.g., to expand its range of products). As we assume it is a public corporation, 
we will not make reference to the shareholder level, for example to natural individuals. Due to 
the diversity of shareholders and their tax situations, it is not possible to include their attrib-
utes in the corporate decision-making process representatively. We therefore concentrate on 
the tax effects on corporate level. The amount the multinational corporation is willing to in-
vest is denoted by I0 (e.g., a manufacturing company plans to extend its product range). It has 
own means (equity capital) that can be invested either in the real investment or in the capital 
market. The capital market interest rate is denoted by r. One half of the transnational invest-
ment I0 is assumed to be made in the holding’s country of domicile H, whereas the remainder 
of I0 is invested in the subsidiary’s country of domicile S.
14  
                                                 
13 Cf. Baldwin, 1959, pp. 98-104. 
14 A proportional investment is assumed in both companies as this enables us to take into account different after-tax cash 
flows for both subsidiary and parent. This also enables us to perform a closer analysis of the cost of capital under varying tax   - 10 - 
The tax assessment will be simulated for a period of ten years within a complete financial 
plan.
15 We model different time patterns of the cash flows  t CF  and start with cash flows that 












1 CF CF ... CF CF CF CF = = = = = =  
with 
H
t CF  the cash flow in the holding and 
S
t CF the cash flow in the subsidiary in period t. 
Taxes are paid on the national tax base given by the cash flow less depreciation allowances, 
where depreciation is a proxy for all non-cash items that can influence the tax base (e.g., pro-
visions, caused by inventory valuation, etc.). For simplicity, we assume a linear depreciation 
for all scenarios as it is the most common depreciation tax allowance in the EU Member 
States. We generate the cash flows in a way that the after-tax rate of return of the real invest-
ment is identical to the interest rate for the financial investment. 
Furthermore, we have to account for the fact that each EU Member State has its own regula-
tions governing loss offset. As all Member States provide for loss carry forwards
16, the possi-
bility of unlimited loss carry forward is given in the following model. For simplicity, special 
minimum tax rules will not be considered in the following investigation.
17 Neither will loss 
carry backs nor possible transnational interpersonal loss offset
18 be considered. Furthermore, 
it is presumed that at the point of investment (t=0) no tax loss carry forwards exist for either 
parent company or subsidiary. At the end of the time horizon (T=10) we assume that the in-
vestment object is disposed of at its carrying value. Consequently, no capital gains occur and 
thus we can abstract from capital gains taxation. If profits are retained (case of retention), all 
retained earnings will be distributed at once at the end of the planning horizon (T=10).  
                                                                                                                                                          
rates in both Member States of domicile. If the investment were performed entirely in the subsidiary’s Member State, the 
effects would be even stronger. In case of a lower (higher) tax rate in the subsidiary’s Member State, the cost of capital would 
decrease (increase). Then, the difference between retaining and distributing earnings, as analyzed in the following section, 
would increase. See section 3.3.2.            
15 This kind of modeling allows us to model real investments that are regularly long-term investments in a multi-period, 
dynamic context. Other approaches, e.g. the effective average tax rates (EATR) according to Devereux and Griffith, are 
based on a simple one-period model and thus tax effects can only be considered to a limited extent (Devereux and Griffith, 
1999). We therefore prefer the finance-based, multi-period model.  
16 While some Member States allow for unlimited loss carry forwards, others only allow them for a limited number of years.  
17 These provisions exist e.g. under Section 10d of the German Income Tax Act.   
18 Transnational loss offset is currently allowable only in Denmark, France, Italy and Austria. The requirements differ signifi-
cantly and to some extent are highly restrictive.    - 11 - 
Our model includes corporate tax only. Local business tax as levied in Germany is not in-
cluded in the model because it has not yet been considered in the present draft concepts of 
CCBT and ETAS.
19 Furthermore, as under the Parent/Subsidiary Directive withholding tax is 
not deducted from earnings distributed by the subsidiary to the holding, we abstract from 
withholding tax.
20 If profits are retained, they are invested in the country where they were 
generated. Otherwise, if they are distributed, dividends are paid at the end of period t and in-
vested in the parent company’s country of domicile at discount rate r.
21 Positive distributed 
earnings of the subsidiary are invested and taxed in the parent’s country of domicile. In real-
ity, this procedure is untypical, especially if the parent is domiciled in a high-tax country and 
if the multinational corporation strives to maximize profits. However, in the following analy-
sis this assumption enables us to draw conclusions about the bias of tax distortions and the 
influence of the different corporate taxation components by varying the tax rates. Moreover, 
in the case of distributed earnings both ETAS and CCCTB have to take account of corporate 
tax rules governing received dividends such as those codified in Section 8b of the German 
Corporate Income Tax Act. This section exempts from taxation earnings that are distributed to 
the parent company. Nonetheless, e.g., in Germany 5% are considered non-deductible operat-
ing expenditure (Section 8b (5), German Corporate Income Tax Act). Consequently, 95% are 
effectively tax-exempt,
22 so that in the following analysis only 5% of the subsidiary’s distrib-
uted earnings are included in the parent’s tax base.
23    
 
                                                 
19 Trade tax is of particular importance specifically in Germany; nonetheless it has repeatedly caused problems in the debate 
at EU level. For contrary argumentation cf., e.g, Spengel/Wendt, 2007, pp. 50-53, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesmi-
nisterium der Finanzen, 2007, p. 58. For simplicity, we abstract from the trade tax in the following investigation.    
20 See Section 5 (1) of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive. 
21 In Germany, only under commercial law may profits be distributed in the same period they are generated. For simplicity, 
we assume this is also possible under tax law.  
22 The German provisions are used here as an example. Similar provisions exist in a number of other Member States. See 
Section 4 (2) of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive.   
23 This proceeding shows the major effects if 95% were effectively tax-exempted. If alternatively 100 percent are tax-
exempted, the impact on the pre-tax cost of capital is negligible.     - 12 - 
3.1.2  ETAS 
Under ETAS the tax bases of the parent and subsidiary are initially determined in accordance 
with the requirements of the parent and subsidiary’s countries of domicile. To determine the 
tax burden under ETAS (Tt
ETAS) in period t, the tax bases before loss offset (TBbL) in the par-
ent and subsidiary’s country are summed up and reduced by clearable loss-offset. The result-
ing amount is multiplied with the tax rate (τ
H) applicable in the parent’s country of domicile:
24   
(1)   Tt
ETAS = τ



















H:     Cash flow in t in the holding’s Member State, 
CFt
S:     Cash flow in t in the subsidiary’s Member State, 
Dt
H:     Depreciation in t in the holding’s Member State 
Dt
S:     Depreciation in t in the subsidiary’s Member State 
IIt
H:    Income on interests in t in the holding’s Member State, 
IIt
S:    Income on interests in t in the subsidiary’s Member State, 
Lct
ETAS:    Clearable, unlimited loss carry-forward in t under ETAS at holding’s level 
TB
H
bL,t:    Tax base before loss offset in t under ETAS at holding’s level, 
 TB
S
bL,t:    Tax base before loss offset in t under ETAS at subsidiary’s level. 
 
In case of a negative total tax base ( 0 T
etas
t < ) it is assumed that an unlimited tax credit carry 
forward is possible.
25 Taxes paid by the subsidiary to its Member State of domicile can be 
credited against the tax burden of the ETAS holding. If a negative balance emerges - known 
as a tax credit carry forward ( t TCCF ) of the group - it may be carried forward in full to the 
following years within the affiliated group. This carry forward reduces the tax burden of the 
multinational corporation in the following periods. Otherwise, a tax burden is generated that 




















t T T < , 
where 
S
t T  denotes the tax credit or the corporate tax paid by the subsidiary, and 
H ETAS,
t T  repre-
sents the remaining tax burden.  
                                                 
24 As no double loss utilization should occur (in the countries of domicile of both parent and subsidiary), the local tax base 
before loss offset is included in the EU tax base. Cf. Hernler, 2003, p. 61; Hernler, 2004a, p. 394. 
25 In ETAS loss offset at the parent level has not been conclusively resolved. However, in the following analysis not signifi-
cantly different tax distortions occur by using another, possibly more restrictive loss offset.    - 13 - 




In the first assessment period the ETAS subsidiary has to pay local taxes in the amount of € 
500,000 to its Member State of domicile. These local taxes (known as the EU tax credit) paid 
to the Member State of the subsidiary are credited against the EU tax base, which is deter-
mined by adding the tax bases of the subsidiary and its holding and which is assumed to 
amount to € 100,000.  
 
Table 2: Determination of the EU Tax Credit Carry Forward According to ETAS 
ETAS holding  ETAS subsidiary 
EU base tax   € 100,000  local tax   € 500,000 
./. EU tax credit   € 500,000     
= EU tax credit carry forward    € 400,000     
 
 
The chosen example illustrates the tax credit mechanism. If the tax rate in the holding’s domi-
cile is significantly lower than the tax rate of the subsidiary’s Member State, an EU tax credit 
results.
27 In addition, an EU tax credit occurs if the holding generates losses and the subsidi-
ary realizes profits.
28   
A tax credit carry forward of € 400,000 remains. The subsidiary pays € 500,000 in the first 
period (t=1) and carries forward the remaining amount of € 400,000 to period 2 (t=2). This tax 
credit carry forward can be credited in full within the group. The tax credit carry forward 
(TCCFt) of the previous period is first credited against the local tax of subsidiary 
S
t T and then 
against the additive tax burden 
ETAS
t T . In the following year the tax credit carry forward is 
credited initially against the local tax burden of the subsidiary, so that the tax credit is either 
                                                 
26 Cf. Hernler, 2004b, pp. 247-248, for a similar example involving an offset of the tax credit carry forward. 
27 E.g., the subsidiary’s tax base amounts to € 1,250,000 and the tax rate of the subsidiary’s domicile is 40%. Hence, the local 
tax burden is € 500,000. If the additional holding’s tax base is € 180,000 the EU tax base is € 1,430,000. If the tax rate of the 
holding’s location is 7%, the resulting EU base tax is € 100,000.   
28 E.g., the tax rate in the holding and the subsidiary’s domicile is 40%. The holding’s tax base (before loss-offset) is -€ 
1,000,000, the subsidiary’s tax base (before loss-offset) is € 1,250,000. Hence, the EU tax base is € 250,000a and the EU base 
tax is € 100,000.     - 14 - 
fully utilized (
TCCF S,
t T ) leading to a remaining positive tax payment of 
S
t T ,  t TCCF  or exactly 0, 
or partly utilized and the remainder (
S






t T TCCF - T = ,   with  t
S
t TCCF T > , 
(3b)  0 TCCF - T t
S
t =   , with  t
S





t TCCF TCCF - T = ,   with  t
S




t T TCCF TCCF − = . 
If the amount that may be carried forward cannot be entirely offset (eq. 3c), the remain-
der
S
t TCCF  can be compensated in a further step up to the amount of the EU base tax 
ETAS
t T at 
the parent level. The remaining tax burden 
TCCF ETAS,
t T  has to be paid to the parent’s Member 
State of domicile. Otherwise, if the remainder 
S
t TCCF  exceeds the tax burden 
ETAS
t T , the re-
maining 
cons
t TCCF  is carried forward to the following periods until the tax credit carry forward 
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t T TCCF TCCF − = . 
It is not yet resolved whether under ETAS, a limitation will be imposed on tax credit carry 
forwards and the tax credit mechanism. The possibility to limit this carry forward in time or 




3.1.3  CCCTB 
As the necessary details for determining the tax base and allocating the tax burden under 
CCCTB have not been finalized yet, we have to make a number of appropriate assumptions in 
order to perform an assessment simulation.  
                                                 
29 Cf. Hernler, 2004b, p. 250.   - 15 - 
As it is anticipated that modified IFRS financial statements will be the starting point, we as-
sume for the sake of simplicity that the tax base under CCCTB will not be broadened due to 
modified tax regulations (Jacobs et al., 2005) and that the determination of business income 
will correspond to the sum of business income under current tax law. In our simplified model 
the consolidated tax base TBt
















CCCTB:   Consolidated business income in t under CCCTB at group level, 
Lct
CCCTB:   Clearable, unlimited loss carry-forward in t under CCCTB at group level, 
TBt
CCCTB:  Tax base in t under CCCTB at group level. 
 
The uniformly determined tax base TBt
CCCTB
 has to be apportioned to countries A and B. In 
this context, the allocation factors are of particular importance as the effects of apportionment 
can vary widely depending on the choice of factors.
30 One possible apportionment system for 
the EU is based on US tax law. In the US, apportionment is based on payroll, property and/or 
sales.
31  
In our model, the factor sales is used as the only allocation factor. With respect to the defini-
tion of sales, it is assumed that they are determined by cash flow. Hence, cash flow is as-
sumed to be 5% of sales.











t S 05 , 0 CF ⋅ = , 
where 
H
t S and 
S
t S  are sales in the holding’s and the subsidiary’s Member States.  
Therefore, the apportionment is determined by  
                                                 
30 Cf., e.g., Wellisch, 2004, p. 25. 
31 Cf., e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000, pp. 127-128. 
32 Thus the payments indirectly include expenditure but not depreciation. The sales/payments ratio conforms to a sample of 
German medium-sized, large-sized enterprises in the engineering industry. The information was taken from the German 
database DAFNE. The sensitivity analysis showed that a variation in the parameter (cash flow in relation to sales) would 
have no significant impact on the results.    - 16 - 





















= , where 
CCCTB
t T  describes the tax burden under CCCTB and 
H τ  and 
S τ  are the 
tax rates in the holding’s and the subsidiary’s Member States.  
The loss offset option currently favoured by the EU Commission
33 and assumed in this analy-
sis foresees that losses remain at the parent level and can be set off against future consolidated 
profits.
34 As the Commission favours transnational loss offset at the parent level, we assume 
that any losses remain at parent level.   
Obviously, many details with respect to the CCCTB have yet to be resolved. The tax burden 
and the resulting effects on investment decisions significantly depend on the choice and 
weighting of the apportionment factors in formula apportionment. A Commission working 
group is currently drafting the apportionment factors. Payroll, sales and property have not 
been excluded so far. As the present analysis uses the “sales” factor, which affects a shift in 
the cost of capital, the main driving factors in our analysis do not depend on the allocation 
formula (retention policy, differentiation between business and non-business income).        
 
3.2 Analysis of the basic scenario      
In the following section we introduce the basic model. In a sensitivity analysis we analyze the 
impact of selected parameters of the underlying systems on the results.  
We presume a market rate of return and a discounting factor of r = 0.1.
35 The parent’s initial 
outlay is given by I0=200. The overall real investment holds for a planning horizon of ten 
years, whereas the investment object is depreciated straight-line over five years, in both coun-
                                                 
33 Cf. European Commission, 2007, p. 6. 
34 Cf. European Commission, 2006b, p. 4. 
35 In consideration of the tax rate in the respective Member State we have  ) τ 1 ( r r
H H
t − ⋅ =  for the after-tax discount rate in 
the holding’s Member State and  ) τ 1 ( r r
S S
t − ⋅ =  for the after-tax discount rate in the subsidiary’s Member State.    - 17 - 
tries A and B, in accordance with the expected taxable useful life.
36 The decision criterion in 
the investigation is the resulting required minimum pre-tax rate of return, which is equal to 
the pre-tax cost of capital. To demonstrate the effects of ETAS and CCCTB in contrast to 
current tax laws in the European Union, the existing tax system is used as starting point in the 
analysis.          
Initially, a tax rate of 30% is assumed in both the parent and the subsidiary’s Member States 
of domicile.
37 Furthermore, earnings are assumed to be retained. Then, the resulting pre-tax 
costs of capital for the different EU tax concepts are almost identical: 
 






Table 3 demonstrates the real investment benefits from tax privileges due to the depreciation 
effects compared to the financial investment with a pre-tax rate of return of 10%.  
Under ETAS, within the first periods of the planning horizon no tax burden accrues for the 
multinational corporation due to depreciation effects. This effect is identical to the one under 
the present tax system. Once the investment is fully depreciated, taxes have to be paid to the 
respective Member State of domicile. Despite the different determination of the tax bases in 
these two tax systems, an identical tax burden results for both parent and subsidiary under 
current tax law and under ETAS. The full effect of the tax credit on the corporate tax already 
paid to the subsidiary’s Member State of domicile decreases the EU base tax under ETAS. No 
tax credit carry forward occurs. By contrast, under CCCTB taxes have to be paid already in 
the second period of the planning horizon to the respective Member State of domicile, result-
ing from the separate loss offset of business or non-business income. Here, interest income is 
                                                 
36 See sensitivity analysis, section 3.3.3 for an analysis with different expected taxable useful lives in Member States A and 
B. 









pre-tax cost of capital before tax  9.5%  9.5%  9.5%   - 18 - 
taxed separately as non-business income and is not set off against operating losses. That is 
why the business income tax base becomes positive at a later point in time than under ETAS 
or current tax law, because the interest income does not increase profit. Under CCCTB these 
interest effects can influence the liquidity in case of high-income payments as taxes on inter-
est income are payable earlier than under ETAS or the present system. In this basic scenario, 
assuming identical tax rates in the EU Member States, the tax burden of the corporation will 
not vary.            
In reality tax rates across the EU differ considerably. For multinational corporations with 
transnational operations, this basic scenario and its uniform level of taxation will not represent 
the normal case. Furthermore, the assumption of a policy of full earnings retention is a very 
simplified premise. Nonetheless, the basic scenario we have just analyzed reflects the greatest 
possible uniformity of results within the different tax concepts. In the following section we 
analyze how differing sets of assumption influence the tax burden under the underlying con-
cepts.   
 
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
3.3.1 Tax Rates 
Using a sensitivity analysis we will now investigate the influence of selected parameters on 
the pre-tax cost of capital and on the tax burden.  
Now, the tax rates in the two Member States of domicile are non-identical and modelled be-
tween 10 and 40%.
38 In addition, we consider two different types of the CCCTB concept. 
Firstly, we distinguish between business and non-business income in analogy to the procedure 
in the US (CCCTB (I)). In this case, non-business income, e.g., interest income and divi-
dends, is not included in the loss compensation, but allocated directly to the respective busi-
                                                 
38 Cf., e.g., Slemrod, 2004, for the implications of changes in nominal and effective company tax rates.   - 19 - 
ness entity.
39 Secondly, we relax the assumption of a differentiation between business and 
non-business income (CCCTB (II)). Then, business income is not taxed separately and in-
cluded in the loss compensation.
40     
The pre-tax cost of capital for the investigated combinations of tax rates under CCCTB, 
ETAS and current tax law for some selected examples is: 
 
Table 4: Pre-Tax Cost of Capital in Case of Retained Earnings   
 Cases  Combination of tax rates  CCCTB (I) 
 




 1   
H τ = 0.4; 
S τ = 0.1  9.7% 9.6%  11.8%  9.7% 
 2   
H τ = 0.3; 
S τ = 0.3  9.5% 9.5% 9.5%  9.5% 
 3   
H τ =  0.1; 
S τ = 0.4  9.6% 9.6% 8.7%  9.6% 
CCCTB (I): Differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB  
CCCTB (II): No differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB   
 
Table 4 shows that under ETAS the real investment is tax discriminated in the case of a pre-
tax rate of return of 11.8%, whereas the pre-tax rate of return of the finance investment 
amounts to 10.0%. This effect occurs under ETAS because of a high tax rate of 40% in the 
holding’s Member State (country H). The subsidiary’s tax base is included in the EU tax base 
and hence also subject to the high tax rate of 40%. In the other cases the real investment is tax 
favoured in all tax systems compared to the financial investment due to dominating deprecia-
tion effects.
41 
Thus, table 4 demonstrates that the chosen combinations of tax rates vary in terms of their 
influence on the pre-tax cost of capital. Major fluctuations occur especially under ETAS. If 
the ETAS holding is domiciled in a high-tax country,
42 the parent’s pre-tax cost of capital is 
on principle higher than under the other tax concepts (cases 1) particularly due to the combi-
                                                 
39 Cf. Weiner, 2005, p. 22; Agúndez-García, 2006, pp.17-18. 
40 This treatment is also recommended by several experts, cf., e.g., Spengel and Wendt, 2007, pp. 37-38.  
41 The present value of linear depreciation is greater than the present value of an economic depreciation and thus a neutral 
depreciation pattern. 
42 High-tax country, viz. 
H τ  > 
S τ .   - 20 - 
nation of a high tax rate and high tax base under ETAS. The high EU tax base, which is mul-
tiplied with a high tax rate, leads to a high EU base tax burden before considering the EU tax 
credit carry forward, so that the parent’s tax burden under ETAS is significantly higher than 
under CCCTB or current tax law. While the corporate tax levied by the Member State of the 
ETAS subsidiary can be credited entirely against the tax liability of the parent company, the 
higher tax rate in the parent’s country of domicile will apply also to the subsidiary’s tax base. 
On balance, the parent will hence have to bear a higher tax burden than under the present sys-
tem and CCCTB.                
By contrast, if the parent is domiciled in low-tax country
43, its cost of capital before tax will 
be relatively lower under ETAS (case 3) as the EU tax base is multiplied with a lower tax rate 
and therefore the parent’s EU base tax will be lower. Due to the tax credit mechanism, the 
subsidiary’s high tax payments in Member State S mean that no or only few remaining taxes 
accrue, so in most cases an EU tax credit carry forward will be formed at parent level. In addi-
tion to the lower EU base tax, this tax credit carry forward will decrease the parent’s tax bur-
den in subsequent periods.    
Obviously, under ETAS the EU tax credit carry forward can have a significant impact on the 
cost of capital. The higher the tax burden in the subsidiary’s Member State and the lower the 
tax burden in the parent’s Member State, the stronger the effects of the EU tax credit carry 
forward on the tax burden. As a result the tax revenue of the subsidiary’s Member State of 
domicile may even decrease. A lower tax burden in the subsidiary’s Member State can arise 
particularly if a negative EU tax base for the ETAS group is determined, and the parent’s tax 
losses cannot be compensated by gains of the ETAS subsidiary even in the long term.    
The pre-tax cost of capital under CCCTB do not vary significantly with varying tax rates 
compared to the current tax system, particularly due to the chosen formula apportionment and 
                                                 
43 Low-tax country, viz. 
H τ  < 
S τ .   - 21 - 
the positive periodical cash flows (CFt).
44 The formula apportionment under CCCTB (I) and 
(II) is merely based on sales, which in our model are assumed to be generated symmetrically 
by the parent and the subsidiary. There are no significant differences between the investigated 
variations of CCCTB (CCCTB (I) and CCCTB (II)). However, small alterations can be identi-
fied with respect to the differentiation towards business and non-business income. The results 
are obvious: Due to the loss-offset between the different income types (ordinary income and 
non-business income) the pre-tax cost of capital under CCCTB (II) is lower than under 
CCCTB (I). Although in our model the effects are rather small, the impact of the differentia-
tion of business and non-business income should not be neglected. Furthermore, we assume 
linear tax rates. In case of progressive tax rates these effects would become stronger. In our 
investigation the cost of capital before taxes and the tax burden are identical under both 
CCCTB (I) and current tax law. In this example, the pre-tax cost of capital under CCCTB (I) 
always remains the same independently of the chosen tax rates. Yet in reality, this similar or 
even identical situation will be an exception. Still, varying the tax rates reveals that CCCTB 
and the current system cause fewer tax rate-induced distortions than ETAS. Nevertheless, 
under CCCTB the Member States lose sovereignty in tax policy. In contrast, the aim under 
ETAS is to preserve competition among the Member States in order to maintain their sover-
eignty while allowing them to approximate their tax rates.   
 
3.3.2 Distribution of earnings 
Under the above assumptions, we find the following pre-tax cost of capital for the investi-
gated combinations of tax rates if earnings are distributed:   
                                                 
44 Bond and Chennels, 2000, and the European Commission, 2001, analyzed the effects of corporate taxation on the cost of 
capital. Bond and Chennels, 2000 limit their investigation to the current tax laws in seven Member States. Besides investment 
decisions at the national level, the investigation also includes transnational investments. Cf. Bond and Chennells, 2000, pp. 7-
14 and 18-21. The European Commission, 2001 also examines different tax scenarios within the EU, e.g. the harmonization 
of depreciation, cf. European Commission, 2001, p. 153. The analysis includes the shareholder level, so that a direct com-
parison with our results is not possible. Nonetheless, the summary of the simulation comes very close to our results particu-
larly with respect to CCTB. Assuming a common consolidated tax base, the cost of capital is identical to the cost of capital 
under the basic scenario and current tax law, cf. European Commission, 2001, pp. 171-176.   - 22 - 
Table 5: Pre-Tax Cost of Capital in Case of Completely Distributed Earnings 




 1   
H τ = 0.4; 
S τ = 0.1  10.7% 9.7%  11.7%  10.8% 
 2   
H τ = 0.3; 
S τ = 0.3  9.6% 9.5%  9.5%  9.6% 
 3   
H τ = 0.1; 
S τ = 0.4  8.7% 9.7%  8.5%  8.7% 
CCCTB (I): Differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB  
CCCTB (II): No differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB   
 
A tax privilege of the real investment is identifiable in all tax systems for cases 2 and 3. Table 
5 shows also that the real investment is tax discriminated in case 1 with respect to the current 
tax system and CCCTB (I).
45  Under CCCTB (I) and the current tax system, this is due to the 
effects of earnings distribution. The required pre-tax rate of return (10.7% or 10.8%) of the 
real investment is higher than the pre-tax rate of return of the financial investment (10%). The 
earnings distributed by the subsidiary are invested and taxed in the holding’s Member State at 
40%. CCCTB (II) has to be regarded as a special case because distributed earnings (as non-
business income) are included in the loss compensation and thus also affect the formula ap-
portionment.  
At first glance, there are no significant differences between distributed and retained earnings 
(table 5 and 4). Neither ETAS nor CCCTB bring forth any surprises with regard to the trans-
national investment in any of these combinations, although the distributed earnings are con-
sidered to be reinvested in the parent’s Member State of domicile. However, a closer look 
reveals that the cost of capital in case of retained earnings varies considerably to that in case 
of distributed earnings (table 6). 
In case of retained earnings the relative differences of the pre-tax cost of capital differ signifi-
cantly under the current tax system and under CCCTB (I), especially if tax rates vary between 
country H and S. Under ETAS these relative differences are smaller. This effect is due to the 
differences in the way the tax systems treat interest. Under current tax law and CCCTB (I) 
                                                 
45 For explanations for ETAS see section 3.3.1   - 23 - 
interest income is taxed as non-business income in the Member State it is generated. In the 
case of distributed earnings, the entire amount of interest income is subject to taxation in the 
parent’s Member State of domicile. If the parent’s Member State has a high tax rate, under the 
present tax system and CCCTB (I) the tax burden will be higher than if earnings are retained 
(case 1). By contrast, with a low tax rate in the parent’s Member State (case 3), the pre-tax 
cost of capital will be lower because the interest income is taxed here.  
 
Table 6: Relative Difference in Cost of Capital before Taxes in Case of Distributed   
















 1   
H τ = 0.4; 
S τ = 0.1  10.3% 1.0%  -0.8%  11.  3% 
 2   
H τ = 0.3; 
S τ = 0,3  1.0% 0.0%  0.0%  1.0% 
 3   
H τ = 0.1; 
S τ = 0.4  -9.4% 1.4%  -2.3%  -9.4% 
CCCTB (I): Differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB  
CCCTB (II): No differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB   
 
ETAS weakens these effects. The simple addition of the tax bases to the EU tax base produces 
a very similar tax base regardless of whether earnings are retained or distributed. It hence 
does not play a significant role where interest income is taxed and what distribution policy is 
favoured. The tax burden is always very similar regardless of whether earnings are distributed 
or retained. Consequently, ETAS produces fewer tax distortions compared to the retained 
earnings case. Under the current system and CCCTB (I) special rules could be integrated into 
the respective tax code to reach a corresponding insensitivity towards earnings distribution 
policy.  
Because there is no differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB 
all types of income are included into the taxable amount. Hence, the relative differences be-
tween retained and distributed earnings are minimized under CCCTB (II). Due to the positive 
cash flow in the initial periods of the planning horizon the interest income is positive. If this   - 24 - 
positive interest income is included in the consolidated tax base it can be set off against busi-
ness income. Thus, the pre-tax cost of capital decreases significantly. Our investigation shows 
that the differentiation between business and non-business income under CCCTB is of par-
ticular importance.      
 
3.3.3 Taxable income  
Whereas CCCTB entails new regulations for a uniform EU-wide determination of taxable 
income, under ETAS the national tax regulations are maintained. The perpetuation of national 
tax laws under ETAS is justified by the fact that otherwise, specific national tax exemptions 
and privileges, e.g. sponsorships of research, would have to be taxed at group level.  
The influence of the national determination of taxable income has not been considered in our 
model so far. To find out the magnitude of a possible impact on our results the assumption of 
a uniform determination is relaxed in this part of the sensitivity analysis. Hence, in the follow-
ing investigation we analyze the impact of applying different national tax codes under ETAS. 
We investigate the influence of different national tax codes by using different expected useful 
lives of the investment object for Member States H and S. The depreciation pattern serves as 
proxy for non-cash determinants of the tax base (e.g., provisions, inventories, etc.). 
 
Table 7: Pre-Tax Cost of Capital for different expected useful lives under ETAS 
 case  1 
H τ =0.4;
S τ =0.1 
case 2 
H τ =0.3;
S τ =0.3 
case 3 
H τ =0.1;
S τ =0.4 
basic scenario  11.8%  9.9%  8.8% 
option 1 11.9%  10.0%  8.8% 
option 2 12.0%  10.3%  8.9% 
Basic scenario: Useful life Member State H (holding) 5 years, Member State S 5 years 
Option 1: Useful life Member State H (holding) 10 years, Member State S immediate write-off  
Option 2: Member State H (holding) immediate write-off, useful life Member State S 10 years 
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Table 7 shows the pre-tax cost of capital for various tax rate combinations and different tax-
able useful lives. These results demonstrate the effects of differing national rules for the tax-
able income under ETAS.  
Generally, there are slight differences with respect to the underlying useful lives for the ana-
lyzed options 1 and 2 compared to the basic scenario. If a longer expected useful life of 10 
years is assumed for the holding’s Member State H and immediate depreciation is presumed 
in the subsidiary’s Member State S, the tax specification of the respective Member States can 
be beneficial for the real investment of the underlying multinational corporation (option 1). 
As table 7 shows, the pre-tax cost of capital is lower under option 1 in cases 1 and 3 in com-
parison to option 2. Under option 2 the holding’s country allows for accelerated depreciation 
and the subsidiary’s country for a 10-year useful life.  
If a long expected useful life of ten years is presumed in the subsidiary’s Member State, the 
tax base is already positive in the first period under review due to the low depreciation allow-
ance. Hence, the local tax burden arises at the subsidiary’s level in the first period. At group 
level a tax credit already occurs in the first period under review, so that the local tax burden 
can be credited against the group’s tax burden. A remaining negative tax credit leads to an EU 
tax credit carry forward.  
Otherwise, if an immediate depreciation can be applied in the subsidiary’s Member State (op-
tion 1), the subsidiary’s tax base is negative in the first period. In subsequent periods the local 
subsidiary’s tax base becomes positive, so that the EU tax credit arises in later periods of the 
planning horizon. In this case, there is no
46 or only a low
47 EU tax credit carry forward due to 
the missing or lower negative credit. The tax credit can be compensated immediately or al-
most completely against the group’s tax burden.  
                                                 
46 If 
H τ = 0.4 und 
S τ = 0.1. The relatively low local tax payments in the subsidiary’s domicile can be credited in full against 
the EU base tax.  
47 If 
H τ = 0.1 und 
S τ = 0.4. The relatively high local tax payments in the subsidiary’s domicile cannot always be credited in 
full against the EU base tax.    - 26 - 
In case of an immediate write-off in the subsidiary’s domicile the effects caused by the EU 
tax credit are higher for the overall planning horizon than in case of the ten-year depreciation. 
For the ten-year planning horizon the EU tax credit will have a greater effect on the group’s 
tax burden in case of an immediate write-off in Member State S and lead to lower pre-tax cost 
of capital under the given set of assumptions. Obviously, the tax rates in the holding or sub-
sidiary’s Member State do not play a major role in our simulation.  
However, we have to point out that these results cannot be generalized for further scenarios 
with inframarginal investment, i.e., cases where the real investment after taxes is more advan-
tageous than the financial investment. Then, our results depend particularly on the chosen 
combinations of tax rates. If a profitable real investment after taxes is assumed, option 2 is 
more attractive, e.g., for a setting with a tax rate of 10% in the parent’s country of domicile 
and a tax rate of 40% in the subsidiary’s country of domicile. In this scenario the chosen 
combination of tax rates and the EU tax credit carry forward invoke a tax benefit.  
In case of marginal investments and multi-period planning the effects differ slightly depend-
ing on the expected useful life. However, if we focus on the tax effects within one period, 
these differences can have considerable impacts.
48 For noteworthy impacts to occur over a 
multi-period planning horizon, the tax bases in the underlying Member States have to differ 
                                                 
48 The possible effects in one single period are demonstrated in the following simple example. It is assumed that the subsidi-
ary performs an investment that amounts to € 50,000. Depending on the expected useful life the following differences can 
occur:  
Expected useful life in the subsidiary’s domicile  10 years  1 year 
Subsidiary tax rate 
S τ =0.1       
Cash flow  € 100k € 100k  
Depreciation    € 5k € 50k 
Tax base  € 95k € 50k  
Taxes paid to the subsidiary’s domicile  € 9.5k € 5k 
   
Holding, tax rate 
H τ =0.4      
Cash flow   € 50k € 50k  
Subsidiary’s tax base   € 95k  € 50k  
EU tax base  € 145k  € 100k  
EU base tax  € 58k  € 40k  
Due to the modified expected useful life the group’s corporate tax payments are €18k higher in case of 10-year depreciation 
in the considered period.   - 27 - 
significantly. Then, further effects may occur due to the resulting interest effects depending 
on the divergent tax payments at different points of time. 
The results demonstrate that multinational corporations can benefit from the perpetuation of 
national tax systems across the EU. By choosing to make tax-optimized real investments cor-
porations can intentionally minimize the tax burden or the pre-tax cost of capital, respectively. 
These effects are due to the different national tax systems and the options regulated in diverse 
national tax laws (e.g., provisions or evaluation of inventories).  
Generally, the EU tax credit can be credited in full against the group’s tax burden if the EU 
base tax is higher than the taxes the subsidiaries paid to their respective Member States. A 
negative EU tax credit (EU tax credit carry forward) under ETAS occurs in particular if the 
tax rate of the holding’s Member State is lower and if the tax rates of the subsidiary’s Member 
State are higher, or if the group’s tax base is negative. A proportionate tax credit would not 
eliminate tax planning completely, but lower the possibilities of intentional tax planning for 
EU-wide operating corporations.
49  
Tax planning, as it is likely to occur under ETAS caused by the determination of national tax-
able incomes and its (undesirable) distortional implications, cannot arise under CCCTB due to 
the uniform regulations for all EU Member States. 
 
3.3.4 Relocation of a business entity’s domicile  
As our previous investigation and the sensitivity analysis for different tax rates show, “losers” 
under ETAS and “winners” under CCCTB are generally groups whose parents are located in a 
high-tax country and whose subsidiaries are domiciled in a low-tax country. Hence, under 
ETAS there is an incentive to relocate the holding’s domicile to a low-tax country to mini-
mize the multinational’s tax burden.  
                                                 
49 Currently, it is not clear under ETAS if the EU tax credit can be entirely or partial credited against the EU base tax. Cf. 
Hernler, 2004b, p. 250.   - 28 - 
Now, we study the tax effects for a scenario where the holding is relocated to a lower-tax 
country. Generally, the EU base tax will be lower if the holding is relocated because the EU 
tax base, or the sum total of the holding and the subsidiary’s tax bases, respectively, are mul-
tiplied by the lower tax rate in the holding’s Member State. The group’s tax burden is conse-
quently lower. Nevertheless, the subsidiary’s tax base and its tax payment to its Member State 
are significant for the group’s tax burden within the considered planning horizon.  
If constant positive and equal cash flows over time are presumed in countries H and S - as is 
assumed in the basic scenario - and if the holding is domiciled in a low-tax country, the sub-
sidiary has to pay its local tax in the first period of the planning horizon to its Member State. 
Due to the credit mechanism a negative surplus of EU tax credit or an EU tax credit carry 
forward, respectively, remains in the first period. No earlier than in the second period, this EU 
tax credit carry forward affects the tax burden of the ETAS group.
50 As the EU tax credit car-
ry forward is first set off against the local tax of the subsidiary in the second period, the tax 
burden is then lower. Hence, there is a permanent disadvantage for the multinational corpora-
tion with respect to interest and liquidity effects. These interest and liquidity effects recur 
once the EU tax credit is consumed and thus have a long-term impact. In case of a restrictive 
credit mechanism the disadvantageous interest and liquidity effects could become even more 
intensive. If the taxes paid by the subsidiaries can be credited in full against the EU base tax, 
there are no negative interest and liquidity effects for the group. In this context it is not exces-
sively advantageous for the ETAS group to relocate only the parent’s domicile – and not the 
value-added part – to a low-tax area. Furthermore, a race-to-the-bottom effect would probably 
not occur as this effect would lead to a permanent EU tax credit carry forward and moreover, 
would not incur an immediate tax benefit. By this means (desired) convergence of the tax 
rates is likely to emerge.
51  
                                                 
50 Hernler confirms this intentional delay of the use of the EU tax credit carry forward (Hernler, 2004b, p. 250). 
51 Cf. Hernler, 2004b, p. 250.   - 29 - 
Nevertheless, the multinational’s tax payments can be lowered by relocating the holding’s 
domicile and taking advantage of the effects caused by substantial EU tax rate differentials. 
For a more restrictive credit mechanism, e.g., a restriction with respect to time or amount, 
specific rules could be implemented in ETAS to prevent the holding’s relocation to low-tax 
countries from being beneficial with respect to taxes. 
Under ETAS a competitive pressure of tax rates is generally considered desirable. A problem-
atic situation may arise if the holding’s tax rate amounts to zero (e.g. in Estonia in case of 
retained earnings). In this case a minimum tax rate would be useful for avoiding such constel-
lations, in that the EU base tax annually amounts to zero. 
The most advantageous situation for the multinational group would be one with almost equal 
tax rates in the underlying countries, as then the taxes the subsidiaries pay to their Member 
States can be credited in full against the group’s tax base.    
The tax rates are significant in both tax systems. The holding’s tax rate is of particular interest 
under ETAS, as the holding’s tax rate is levied on both the holding and the subsidiary’s tax 
base (EU tax base). Moreover, the results significantly depend on the subsidiary’s profit situa-
tion.
52    
In contrast, under CCCTB the holding and the subsidiary’s tax rates are important value driv-
ers, depending on the allocation factor. However, the tax rates are the only component the 
Member States can autonomously determine under CCCTB. In principle, multinationals will 
react more sensitively with respect to the tax rates under ETAS or CCCTB than under the 
current tax system.  
With respect to current conditions this situation may obviously be disadvantageous for high-
tax countries and furthermore, may oblige high-tax Member States to reduce their tax rates. 
Under ETAS an approximation of the tax rates to a medium level is likely due to the deferred 
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subsidiary does not realize taxable profits but generates losses, the EU tax credit amounts to zero and no EU tax credit carry 
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tax credit mechanism. However, under CCCTB the Member States run the risk of reducing 
their tax rates to a minimum level (“race to the bottom”) to counteract tax competition. Unlike 
ETAS, CCCTB does not include a mechanism for preventing a “race to the bottom” of the tax 
rates. Accordingly, implementing a minimum tax rate may be advisable under CCCTB.
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Furthermore, the credit mechanism of ETAS can counteract the relocation of active opera-
tions, as long as the holding’s member state does durably not maintain the highest tax rate. A 
relocation of active operations (e.g., employment) is more conceivable under CCCTB, be-
cause depending on the allocation factors (e.g., payroll) the relocation can then be favoured. 
This circumstance could particularly discriminate industrial countries under CCCTB.   
 
4 Summary 
The components of a European tax system with CCCTB or ETAS differ significantly. Never-
theless, we can perform a comparison in the chosen model framework. We determine the 
minimum required minimum pre-tax rate of return of a real investment in comparison to a 
financial investment within a multinational group. We identify for specific scenarios under 
which conditions and tax concepts a real investment is tax favoured or tax discriminated. Fur-
thermore, we show that both ETAS and CCCTB react sensitively to the variation of selected 
parameters, but each in their own way. 
Our analyses demonstrate that the tax planning that is possible under the current tax system 
will be impaired under ETAS and under CCCTB.   
With respect to tax rate differentials in the EU Member States we find that the “losers” under 
ETAS and the “winners” under CCCTB are generally groups whose holdings are located in a 
high-tax country and whose subsidiaries are domiciled in a lower-tax country. By contrast, 
corporations where the parent is domiciled in a lower-tax country and the subsidiary is located 
in a high-tax country are the “winners” under ETAS and “losers” under CCCTB. Hence, tax 
                                                 
53 Cf. Spengel, 2007.   - 31 - 
planning is possible under ETAS to a greater extent than under CCCTB due to the inclusion 
of all profits in the ETAS EU tax base that is then multiplied with the tax rate in the holding’s 
state of domicile. Under ETAS the advantage of the real investment in comparison of the fi-
nancial investments depends more heavily on the relation of the tax rates than under CCCTB 
or the current tax system.   
For multinational corporations, tax planning under ETAS is not likely with respect to reten-
tion policy due to the EU tax base. Under CCCTB the outcomes for different retention poli-
cies significantly depend on the differentiation between business and non-business income. A 
concept of CCCTB where business income and non-business income are treated differently 
(see CCCTB (I)) is not recommended under the given set of assumptions, because tax plan-
ning for multinationals could be attractive depending on their retention policy. This effect is 
due to the differently taxed interest income; thus the distorting potential could be higher. As 
our results show, multinationals cannot influence their tax burden via their retention policy 
under CCCTB without differentiating between these different income types (see CCCTB (II)).    
Further, tax planning can be performed with respect to the determination of taxable income 
under ETAS, whereas it is not as attractive for multinationals under CCCTB because of uni-
form EU-wide tax regulations. 
The competitive pressure resulting from the different tax rates is intended to lead to a conver-
gence of tax rates at medium level and the perpetuation of tax competition. However, there is 
still an incentive to relocate the holding to a lower-tax country. The sensitivity analysis shows 
that the ETAS tax credit mechanism can prevent a relocation of the ETAS holding in profit 
situations, as there is a long-term impact with respect to interest and liquidity. However, un-
der CCCTB the relocation of each business entity will be of particular importance when mul-
tinational groups optimize their European tax burden. A mechanism to prevent a “race to the 
bottom” in tax rates in the EU is not yet part of the CCCTB concept. The only way to circum-
vent this development under CCCTB is to introduce a minimum tax rate at EU level. The re-  - 32 - 
location of active operation is more feasible under CCCTB depending on the allocation fac-
tors, whereas the credit mechanism under ETAS can even prohibit the relocation of any active 
operation.         
In the sensitivity analysis we find out that tax planning still remains possible in some aspects 
under CCCTB and ETAS. Furthermore, the analysis points out that under ETAS and CCCTB 
several advantages can be specified, in comparison to the current tax system. Still, our results 
particularly depend on the assumptions made. E.g., assumptions about the loss-offset rules for 
both analyzed systems are made, as we focus on an unlimited loss-carry forward for ETAS 
and CCCTB. However, in both concepts the loss-offset rules are of significant relevance 
(Oestreicher and Koch, 2008). Furthermore, under ETAS it could be important for a multina-
tional’s tax planning whether full compensation or a proportionate tax credit will be imple-
mented.  
All in all, much discussion and analysis is still needed before CCCTB or a concept that is 
more oriented towards the principle of domicile (such as ETAS) can be implemented in the 
European Union. It is not possible to state unambiguously whether one system is more or less 
advantageous than the other as they differ considerably and many details remain unclear. Our 
analysis illustrates that many tax distortions will persist even after ETAS or CCCTB are in-
troduced. Nevertheless, it shows that ETAS also provides several advantages compared to the 
higher-profile CCCTB, as under ETAS tax planning and in turn, tax distortions are in many 
cases less likely.  
In summary, we find ETAS offers several important advantages compared to CCCTB and is a 
viable option, considering that it is simpler and easier to implement. Hence, ETAS has the 
potential to improve allocational and administrative efficiency and thus should be further 
elaborated.  
Finally, we point out that the advantages of each tax system significantly depend on the indi-
vidual investment situation the multinational corporation faces. However, the advantages also   - 33 - 
depend on the legal framework and the definition of the respective concept. Politicians should 
keep in mind the sensitivities, advantages and drawbacks of both concepts when developing a 
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